A land swap between Kosovo and Serbia would be deeply problematic - and potentially dangerous by Rossi, Michael
A	land	swap	between	Kosovo	and	Serbia	would	be
deeply	problematic	–	and	potentially	dangerous
There	has	been	speculation	in	recent	weeks	that	the	leaders	of	Kosovo	and	Serbia	have	explored	the
option	of	a	land	swap,	with	some	predominantly	ethnic-Albanian	areas	of	Serbia	being	traded	for
Serbian	majority	areas	in	Kosovo.	Michael	Rossi	argues	that	an	exchange	of	territory	would	do	little	for
the	Serbian	or	Albanian	communities	involved	and	could	pose	a	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	region.
The	increased	chatter	around	normalising	relations	between	Serbia	and	Kosovo	has	seemed	to	once
again	revisit	the	taboo	topic	of	partitioning	the	territory,	even	though	all	participating	sides	have	officially	dismissed
such	ideas	in	the	past.	More	recently	–	and	more	ominously	–	there	has	been	talk	of	a	potential	“land	swap”	that
would	exchange	the	Serb-inhabited	area	of	northern	Kosovo	with	the	Albanian-inhabited	Preševo	Valley	as	some
sort	of	“compromise”	between	presidents	Aleksandar	Vučić	and	Hashim	Thaçi.	Again,	all	of	this	appears	to	be	little
more	than	gossip	for	the	time	being,	but	even	rumours	are	enough	to	raise	tensions	in	an	already	tense	region.
Moreover,	with	international	observers	opining	this	month	on	the	potential	dangers	of	border	changes,	one	would
think	those	people	in	charge	would	issue	some	sort	of	statement	to	put	these	rumours	to	rest.	Unfortunately	talks	of
partition	only	seem	to	be	intensifying.	In	the	last	few	days,	Serbian	President	Vučić	has	advocated	for	some	sort	of
“delimitation”	with	Kosovo.	Whatever	that	means	currently	remains	a	mystery,	as	Vučić	is	prone	to	keeping	vaguely-
worded	statements	a	secret	for	his	own	ends.	Whether	it	is,	as	Daniel	Serwer	observed,	a	euphemism	for	“partition”,
or	simply	a	“correction”	of	borders	that	exchanges	a	few	villages	here	for	a	few	there,	as	Wolfgang	Petritsch	tried	to
clarify,	is	unclear.	Along	these	lines,	Kosovo	President	Thaçi	has	openly	dismissed	talks	of	“partition”	yet	still
somehow	envisions	the	Preševo	Valley	merging	with	Kosovo	in	a	final	settlement	with	Serbia.
How	this	will	work	is	something	only	Thaçi	seems	to	know.	Additionally,	from	what	we	know	of	border	“corrections”
and	“demarcations”	Kosovo	has	made	with	Montenegro,	the	subject	is	highly	controversial	for	political	hardliners	who
have	openly	disrupted	parliamentary	sessions	with	tear	gas	to	prevent	discussion	of	Kosovo	giving	up	any	of	its
territory.
All	of	this	has	unleashed	a	series	of	reactions	in	the	Serbian	and	Kosovan	press	trying	to	figure	out	what	deals,	if
any,	were	made	behind	closed	doors	in	Brussels	between	Vučić	and	Thaçi.	That	Kosovo	has	failed	in	forming	the
Assembly	of	Serbian	Municipalities	(ZSO)	that	has	been	so	crucial	to	the	2013	Brussels	Agreement	may	be	reason
for	Vučić	to	conclude	progress	is	at	a	standstill	and	alternative	options	need	to	be	considered.	If	talks	of	a	land	swap
with	Thaçi	have	happened,	this	does	Pristina	a	huge	favour	since	it	not	only	alleviates	them	from	the	responsibility	of
forming	ZSO,	but	it	relieves	them	of	having	to	worry	about	a	contentious	north	that	has	never	come	under	Pristina’s
control.
Whatever	the	reason,	it	has	left	Serbs	in	Kosovo	visibly	and	vocally	shaken	as	to	a	future	they	seem	to	have	no	input
in.	The	Serbian	Orthodox	Church	in	Kosovo	has	adamantly	proclaimed	any	and	all	opposition	to	partition	that	would
leave	more	than	sixty	percent	of	its	people	south	of	the	Ibar	River	(the	assumed	dividing	line)	in	a	rump	Kosovo	that
would	ostensibly	include	an	additional	thirty	to	forty	thousand	ethnic	Albanians	from	the	Preševo	Valley.	The
internationally	respected	Abbot	of	Visoki	Dečani	Monastery,	Sava	Janjić,	has	become	a	one-man	advocate	on	social
media	in	highlighting	the	fears	and	uncertainties	he	and	his	flock	seem	to	face	from	Belgrade	apparently	abandoning
them	to	an	unknown	fate	–	an	ironic	decision	considering	the	parts	of	Kosovo	that	actually	matter	to	Serbian	cultural,
historical,	and	religious	identity	are	almost	all	in	the	part	of	the	territory	Belgrade	would	write	off	if	partition	were
accepted.	In	a	seemingly	surreal	event,	officials	in	Belgrade	are	even	castigating	him	and	the	Church,	the	very
symbols	of	Serbia’s	presence	in	Kosovo,	for	being	recalcitrant	to	government	ideas.
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Hashim	Thaçi,	President	of	Kosovo,	Credit:	NATO	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
Among	ethnic	Albanians,	Hashim	Thaçi	is	risking	becoming	persona	non	grata	within	political	and	journalistic	circles
for	apparently	making	a	deal	that	would	shear	off	northern	Kosovo,	and	with	it,	any	hopes	of	ever	attaining	control	of
two	critically	important	industrial	assets	for	Kosovo’s	weak	economy:	the	Trepča	Mining	complex,	and	the	Gazivode
dam	and	hydroelectric	plant.	Both	were	already	feared	of	being	monopolised	by	Kosovo	Serbs	in	any	arrangement
that	creates	ZSO,	but	with	a	formal	partition,	the	territory	would	effectively	be	lost	to	another	state.
To	add	to	the	uncertainties,	Russia	has	recently	announced	its	willingness	to	support	whatever	agreement	Serbia
reaches	with	Kosovo,	under	the	blanket	statement	that	it	has	always	supported	Belgrade’s	decision	regarding	its	own
territory.	In	short,	partition,	which	has	always	been	an	option	denied	by	international	actors,	now	seems	to	be
considered	a	viable	alternative	to	an	intractable	frozen	conflict	between	Serbia	and	a	disputed	territory.	If	such	an
agreement	includes	Serbia’s	recognition	of	Kosovo	and	its	subsequent	entry	in	the	United	Nations	as	a	de	jure	state,
the	fate	of	a	few	ten	thousand	Serbs	in	Kosovo	may	seem	like	a	small	price	to	pay	for	a	definitive	peace.
The	problem,	as	many	have	already	opined,	is	that	partition	(or	land	swap,	delineation,	delimitation,	border
correction,	or	whatever	synonym	is	used)	is	both	problematic	and	dangerous,	and	should	be	resolutely	rejected	by	all
concerned	international	actors.	Along	with	the	risks	it	carries	in	opening	the	proverbial	“Pandora’s	Box”	for	at	least	a
dozen	similar	breakaway	entities,	there	are	key	issues	concerning	the	stability	of	both	Kosovo	and	Serbia.
The	problems	with	partition
First,	partition	does	nothing	to	benefit	the	Serb-inhabited	regions	of	northern	Kosovo.	The	assumption	among	many
is	that	northern	Kosovo	remains	the	last	major	foothold	Belgrade	has	in	the	region.	This	is	not	entirely	true	as	the
lack	of	any	central	authority	in	nearly	two	decades	has	created	a	unique	set	of	powerbrokers	that	include	political
strongmen	and	organised	crime	heads	that	effectively	run	the	region.	They	may	defer	to	Belgrade,	but	they	control
the	day-to-day	operations	and	have	amassed	sufficient	wealth	and	prestige	to	be	their	own	voices	and	decision-
makers	in	Kosovo’s	future.
Thus	to	reabsorb	them	into	Serbia	proper	risks	a	highly	likely	power	struggle	between	Belgrade	attempting	to
reassert	control,	and	the	powers	that	have	run	the	region	as	their	own	fiefdom	since	at	least	2008.	Within	Kosovo,
the	region	receives	disproportionate	international	attention	that	includes	both	political	and	economic	investment.
Within	Serbia,	the	region	would	leave	international	attention,	with	North	Mitrovica,	a	city	itself	divided	at	the	Ibar,
becoming	just	another	run-down	neglected	border	town.	Whatever	privileges	the	north	has	been	receiving	would
most	likely	be	lost.
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Second,	a	hypothetical	land	swap	equally	does	nothing	for	the	Albanian-populated	regions	of	Preševo.	Calls	among
hardliners	in	Pristina	to	annex	what	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	“Eastern	Kosovo”	are	rarely,	if	ever,	echoed	by
Albanian	officials	in	Preševo	who,	like	their	Serb	counterparts	in	northern	Kosovo,	enjoy	a	special	status	as	a
mobilised	minority	that	can	use	its	leverage	to	extract	concessions	from	the	political	centre	under	threat	of	ethnic
unrest.	If	they	merged	with	Kosovo,	these	advantages	would	disappear	as	they	would	no	doubt	be	forced	to	be
subordinate	to	another	set	of	political	elites	and	factions	in	Pristina,	where	rival	groups	jockeying	for	power	already
make	politics	a	contentious	profession.
Beyond	that,	it	is	still	unclear	whether	any	solution	reached	with	Serbia	will	guarantee	Kosovo’s	status	as	an
internationally	sovereign	state.	Currently,	Serbia	is	under	no	real	pressure	to	extend	formal	recognition,	which	is	also
opposed	by	a	number	of	states	in	both	the	European	Union	and	the	United	Nations.	Thus,	if	any	compromise
reached	leaves	out	the	critically	important	requirement	of	recognition,	which	it	very	well	might,	it	does	Preševo
Albanians	no	good	to	go	from	being	citizens	of	an	internationally	recognised	country	to	joining	a	disputed	territory
with	no	hope	of	gaining	constitutive	sovereignty.
Third,	partition	critically	endangers	any	future	for	Serbian	communities	or	cultural	heritage	in	central	and	southern
Kosovo.	Serbs	south	of	the	Ibar	are	scattered	in	a	series	of	disjointed	villages	and	municipalities;	the	largest	being
the	town	of	Gračanica,	which	numbers	just	over	ten	thousand	Serbs,	and	prior	to	1999	served	as	little	more	than	a
village	suburb	of	Pristina.	Any	partition	or	land	swap	severely	reduces	their	presence	and	political	voice	without	the
North	serving	as	an	urban	stronghold.	With	the	thought	of	being	abandoned	by	Belgrade,	and	with	the	possibility	of
Pristina	being	even	less	inclined	to	offer	them	any	form	of	political	autonomy	than	they	are	now,	most	Serbs	would
feel	compelled	to	leave.	What	remained	would	be	little	more	than	an	ethnographic	novelty,	useful	only	insofar	as	it
would	allow	international	officials	to	visit	the	region	and	convince	themselves	that	Kosovo	remained	a	multiethnic
state.
Fourth,	partition	undermines	years	of	dedicated	efforts	by	the	international	community	to	find	a	lasting	solution.
Kosovo	was	envisioned	by	its	sponsors	to	be	multiethnic.	This	has	been	repeatedly	encapsulated	in	documents	like
the	Ahtisaari	Plan	and	the	Brussels	Agreement	which	empower	the	Serb	communities	to	a	degree	where	they	feel
safe	and	secure	enough	to	live	ostensibly	in	another	country.
What	tends	to	be	lost	in	the	narrative	is	that	Albanians	always	considered	multiethnic	consociationalism	a	price	to	be
paid	in	exchange	for	international	assistance	for	their	own	long-sought	self-determination.	It	is	usually	forgotten	that
while	Kosovo’s	separation	from	Serbia	may	have	been	predicated	on	conflict	in	1999,	that	conflict	stems	from	a
longstanding	desire	by	its	ethnic	Albanian	community	to	boycott	participation	in	all	Yugoslav	associations	in	order	to
eventually	separate	and	unite	with	Albania	as	far	back	as	1990.	Albanians	never	envisioned	a	Kosovo	under	their
control	to	be	anything	other	than	Albanian.	Serbs,	Serbian	heritage,	and	Serbian	claims	to	the	territory	were	all
disregarded	in	Albanian	historical	memory.
Thus,	while	opponents	of	Kosovo’s	statehood	blame	Western	powers	for	enabling	and	empowering	erstwhile
separatists,	it	is	the	very	same	Western	powers	that	took	an	active	role	in	redesigning	Kosovo	to	be	as	inclusive	of
Serbs	and	other	non-Albanian	communities	as	possible.	In	other	words,	independence,	which	Albanians	long
desired,	would	be	designed,	structured,	administered,	and	defined	as	an	international	initiative	that	would	be
considerably	different	from	what	Albanians	actually	envisioned.	Partition	effectively	nullifies	all	of	this,	upends	all
international	agreements,	and	gives	credence	to	those	not	just	in	Kosovo	but	in	Bosnia	and	Macedonia	who
advocate	pan-ethnic	states.
The	issue	here	is	that	any	partition	or	land	swap	effectively	draws	new	borders	which	the	international	community
has	been	loath	to	do.	Since	1945,	the	creation	of	new	states	out	of	existing	ones	has	traditionally	respected	the
principle	of	uti	possidetis,	which	recognises	new	international	boundaries	from	the	borders	of	preexisting	colonial	or
constituent	federal	republic	units.	Leaving	to	one	side	the	debate	over	whether	Kosovo’s	statehood	qualifies	as
meeting	this	principle	since	it	was	a	territory	and	not	a	federal	unit	within	Yugoslavia,	proponents	of	its	independence
view	its	borders	to	be	those	it	had	as	an	autonomous	province	of	Serbia.	Drawing	a	new	line	at	the	Ibar	River	and
incorporating	the	Preševo	Valley	is	something	completely	unprecedented	in	international	law	in	the	modern	age.
A	threat	to	stability
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Currently,	we	neither	know	what	Vučić’s	plan	for	“delimitation”	is,	nor	do	we	know	whether	any	such	arrangement	will
be	agreed	upon	with	Kosovo	and	the	international	community.	What	we	do	know	is	that	such	talk	risks	destabilising
an	already	volatile	region	that	includes	Macedonia	and	Bosnia	where	groups	eager	to	redraw	borders	would	be	quick
to	capitalise	on	a	new	precedent	being	set.	We	also	know	that	the	United	States	has	again	repeated	its	opposition	to
any	exchange	of	territories,	though	its	influence	in	the	region	is	no	longer	as	decisive	as	what	it	once	was.	Finally,	a
number	of	NGOs	in	both	Serbia	and	Kosovo	–	Serbian	and	Albanian	–	have	issued	a	rare	joint	letter	to	EU	High
Representative	Frederica	Mogherini	petitioning	her	to	make	an	unambiguous	statement	against	either	Kosovo’s
division	or	any	exchange	of	territories.
All	of	this	should	be	a	welcome	sign	that	rumours	of	partition	may	remain	just	that.	If	all	of	this	is	simply	a	way	for
Belgrade	to	get	the	international	community	to	increase	pressure	on	Pristina	to	implement	parts	of	the	Brussels
Agreement	that	establishes	ZSO,	or	even	as	a	way	to	simply	test	the	limits	of	their	diplomatic	leverage,	it	is	a
dangerous	game	to	play.	The	same	applies	to	Kosovo	where	years	of	stalling	on	creating	ZSO	has	tested	the
patience	of	Pristina’s	closest	supporters.	To	suddenly	scuttle	this	arrangement	in	favour	of	a	territorial	swap	is
irresponsible.
Neither	partition	nor	a	land	swap	will	benefit	anyone	involved	in	Kosovo’s	final	status.	“Velvet	divorces”	and
“negotiated”	territorial	adjustments	are	not	part	of	the	region’s	history	and	calls	to	redraw	borders	and	possibly	trade
territory	would	almost	certainly	degenerate	into	violence	and	chaotic	population	exchanges.	If	groups	as	disparate	as
the	Kosovo	Women’s	Network,	the	Helsinki	Commission	for	Human	Rights	in	Serbia,	and	the	Serbian	Orthodox
Church	all	agree	on	opposing	this	issue,	it	is	an	issue	worth	opposing.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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